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exactly these structures in mind when severely tightening the
anti-treaty-shopping rule in 2007. In order to receive any reim-
bursement of the retained withholding tax on the distribution
of German dividends, the U.S. taxpayer has to comply in ad-
vance and deal readily with this new obstacle.
Furthermore, since the new unilateral anti-treaty-shopping
rule reaches beyond the scope of the LoB clause in the Ger-
many-U.S. treaty, in which both countries exhaustively defi-
ne abusive behavior, the provision must be considered as an
illegal treaty-override.
At the moment, the taxpayer has two options to deal with the
anti-treaty-shopping rule: First, sit, wait, and hope that the ECJ
will proclaim the new rule to violate EC law, or second, react
by tax-planning.
Furthermore, the worldwide trend is to tighten anti-abuse
rules from general anti-abuse rules (GAAR) over specific anti-
treaty-shopping regimes (in particular in Germany) and CFC
rules, to unilateral subject-to-tax provisions like the German
§ 50d(9) EStG.
The general anti-abuse rules focus on economic substance or
the business purpose.
In international tax law there is a trend to tighten the deduc-
tibility of finance expenses by drafting and enacting more
restrictive thin cap rules. A good and recent example is the
introduction of the German Zinsschranke that has tightened
the deductibility of interest payments extensively. Instead of
the formerly accepted debt-to-equity ratio of 1.5:1 (Safe Ha-
ven), the new rule provides for a deduction of only 30% of
the EBITDA in excess of the net interest balance. Anything
beyond is subject to three exceptions, of which the escape
clause is the most likely option for MNCs. Yet, its complexity
demands many efforts before U.S. MNCs can rely on the esca-
pe clause. Moreover, the Zinsschranke has a very detrimental
effect on holding companies as their formerly granted specific
Safe Haven has been abolished without any substitution. Hen-
ce, holding companies are virtually barred from taking advan-
tage of the escape clause. In fact, holding companies are di-
scriminated against since they cannot deduct the book value of
their participations for purposes of calculating the debt-equity
ratio.
VI. Conclusion
At the end of the day, there is neither a perfect location for a
holding company nor a perfect repatriation strategy. Yet, this
account has to identify the legal framework including the ob-
stacles, enabling each U.S. MNC to create and pursue an in-
dividual long-term repatriation strategy in an ever-changing tax
world.
Stephen Utz*
Tax Reform in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis
This article is based on my comments last May to a DAJV
audience in Berlin about the prospects for US tax reform un-
der President Barack Obama. To an earlier DAJV audience,
also in Berlin, I had spoken on the same general subject during
the 2008 presidential campaign. My predictions on the first
occasion served as a starting point for a re-evaluation on the
second, which I amend slightly here to take account of even
recent developments.
I am a rather narrow tax specialist, neither a political commen-
tator nor a sociologist, and like a good academic I live in the
clouds. In the summer of 2008, despite these handicaps, I gave
my best guesses about what Hillary Clinton or John McCain or
the long-shot Barack Obama might do if they won the election.
Now that the dust is well settled on President Obama's victory,
some of my guesses are coming true. But the unfolding tax
legislative process is of course shaped in part by the financial
crisis, whose scale and severity were not at all obvious when
I gazed into my crystal ball. Then as now, the best chance for
principled tax reform is to bring everyone to the table at the
same time: the more interest groups affected by the proposed
reforms, the greater the chance that synthesis will actually oc-
cur. It seems that the Obama administration initially hoped to
use the power of simultaneous pain to achieve a useful result;
as the new president's first year in office comes to a close, that
may no longer be as likely.
To set the stage, it may be worthwhile to dwell briefly on the
legislative process in Washington. Each of the two houses of
Congress has a tax-writing committee - the Finance Com-
mittee in the Senate, the Ways and Means Committee in the
. University of Connecticut School of Law.
House. The chairpersons of these committees have always
been powerful. Charles Rangel, the current chair of the Ways
and Means Committee, is on the left of the Democratic Par-
ty. He is associated with calls for broadening the corporate
tax base, by eliminating tax deductions and other favorable
adjustments, but he also represents Manhattan, and so he is a
bomb-throwing anarchist with a surprising sympathy for the
financial sector. By the way, he has recently admitted failing
to pay income tax on rental income from property he owns in
the Dominican Republic, and so I'm sure he can understand
the tender consciences of those who use illegitimate tax shel-
ters. Max Baucus, the chair of the Senate Finance Committee,
is a Democrat from Montana and is considered a centrist. Both
are likely to take prominent roles in writing new tax legislation
and are at least superficially working for Obama's proposals.
"Writing new legislation" has a special meaning for Congress.
It does not mean actually drafting the language of new tax pro-
visions. Instead, it means brokering deals about very broad
tax proposals coupled with revenue and cost projections from
the Congressional Budget Office, a research service that is in-
tended to be and usually is nonpartisan. In 1984-1986, when
Congress passed the last big tax reform act and in 1997 when
it cut the capital gains tax rate, the discussion was, to use the
favorite word "conceptual," that is, framed entirely in general
terms, without specific legislative language for the legislators
to consider. The vote on the bill almost took place before any-
one had seen the language. History is likely to repeat itself if
and when Congress again takes up broad tax reform.
The starting point for the Obama administration was some-
what favorable to the prospects for principled tax reform. Just
as the new president and new Congress settled into power, the
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financial crisis and the public outcry against "greed" strong-
ly favored eliminating tax breaks. Despite or because of the
government's commitment to helping banks and auto makers
survive, the public was unhappy with the rich and former rich,
and this feeling seemed to extend to anything big and corpo-
rate. The administration seemed intent on harnessing the pub-
lic mood for a variety of purposes, including a partial return to
the pre-2000 Internal Revenue Code. This would have meant
fewer breaks for high-income earners and big business but also
possibly fewer "Christmas tree" ornaments for a wide range of
special interests, not all of them commercial or well heeled. Did
President Obama's tax agenda look as if it would implement
the public desire to clean house? Remember that his campaign
promises were made before the crisis fully emerged.
Before the financial crisis and related public fallout, there had
been ominous stock market declines and the credit market was
already fragile, but no one yet expected half the big banks of
the US and Europe to need bailouts, and hedge funds hadn't
yet had to de-leverage rapidly, although they had already be-
gun quietly to withdraw from many acquisitions. Back then,
however, federal budget deficits were attracting lots of atten-
tion. When I spoke to the DAJV in Berlin in 2008, I concluded
that any Democratic or Republican White House-cum-Con-
gress would strive to do something about them. It seemed to
me very likely that whoever took office would begin taking the
national debt seriously because the debt service was putting
pressure on the US government's ability to borrow. I expected
other issues to influence the politics of taxation in the US, but
this objective problem struck me as the most pressing.
The national debt almost doubled during the eight years of
President George W. Bush's presidency. Neither party empha-
sized this during the 2008 campaign season. Perhaps even the
Democrats had accepted the Bush administration's bookkeep-
ing trick of not counting the cost of the Iraq War as part of the
national debt - the war accounted then for only about /4 of
the $4.5 trillion increase in the debt but was expected to cost
twice that much in the next few years - which still seems to be
a fair prediction.' Actually, most of the debt increase result-
ed from Bush-era tax reductions and new spending programs.
Some of these tax reductions had gone to the middle class
and the poor, but the lion's share - about 80% - had gone to
the 2% of the country who report about 20% of the country's
income (I say "report" because it is a good guess that under-
reporting and tax avoidance are very highly developed at this
income level).
Other generous programs of the Bush era may have spread
benefits more evenly, but it is impossible to tell. For exam-
ple, the Bush Medical Modernization Act of 2002 gave elderly
Americans a fairly generous prescription drug program - the
first drug program. But much of the benefit of this program
went to drug and insurance companies that were guaranteed
a high profit margin for a larger market. The universal health
legislation that Congress is likely to pass may eliminate some
of this subsidy for insurance companies. Apart from this de-
ficit-provoking feature of Medicare, the program as a whole
was and remains fully funded by earmarked payroll and self-
employment taxes.
I Martin A. Sullivan, a reporter for Tax Analysts, has recently blogged his
horror at the Obama underestimation of future deficits. Martin A. Sullivan,
Goofy Responses to a Gloomy Budget, May. 12, 2009, at www.tax.com.
The tone of Sullivan's blog comments was less restrained than that of his
analyses of falling effective corporate tax rates worldwide. I rely below on
his research. See note 5 infra.
2 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Linda J. Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War:
The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (2008).
Less conspicuous spending commitments of the last adminis-
tration included military weapons development, privatized
government operations, more generous tax benefits for real
estate, heavy industry, and high income earners, but also
an increased refundable income tax (the earned income tax
credit) that has greatly expanded the country's social safety
net. Perhaps the greatest spending program of all was a bud-
get decrease ... for tax auditing and collection. None of the
spending was for infrastructure, either. The Obama adminis-
tration has pushed for more tax audit and collection funding
and for a broad plan of infrastructure improvements, the latter
as part of the Obama stimulus package.
In response to the growing need for federal revenue, the Oba-
ma administration, as it took office, seemed likely to strive to
eliminate loopholes. It is not surprising that during the long
2008 campaign, neither the future president nor any of his ri-
vals sounded an alarm over the growth of the national debt.
That would have been tantamount to threatening the public
with an overall tax increase. Explicit increases in tax rates are
very dangerous to the health of US politicians. George Bush
Sr is thought to have been defeated in his second run for the
presidency because he promised "no new taxes" but had to
raise rates anyway. Since his loss in 1992, other US politici-
ans have thought it wiser not to hint at adjusting tax burdens
at all.
Even if President Obama, before or shortly after the election,
had wished to raise taxes, the existence of a number of tax
rate provisions that contain "sunset" provisions would have
complicated his prospects for doing so. (If a legislative act
provides for its own expiration on a certain future date, it is
said to contain a "sunset" provision.) Unless Congress acts,
in 2009 the top tax rate on dividends will increase from 15
percent to 35 percent. The principal capital gain rate will rise
from 15 percent to 20 percent. And in 2010, the Bush tax cuts
of 2003 - which reduced the tax rates applicable to taxable
income by about 5% each from earlier rates (from 15%, 28%,
31%, 36%, and 39.5% to 10%, 25%, 28%, 33% and 35%),
estate tax repeal, marriage penalty relief, and many other tax
reductions of the Bush era will expire. Thus, if Obama and his
party's majority in Congress wanted to raise rates by allowing
the Bush tax cuts to expire, they need not lift a finger, because
this will happen without new legislation. But low and middle-
income taxpayers will also face higher tax rates, if the Bush
tax cuts are allowed to expire - not so appetizing for the new
incumbents.
When the economic downturn is taken into account, the
chances of passive across-the-board tax rate increases fall to
zero, at least in the short term. So let's assume that open rate
increases for the mass of the public are out of the question.
What else can happen?
Consider the "tax gap." This often-mentioned "dark hole"
is the difference between government estimates of the total
amount of US income that is legally subject to the income tax
and the amount - smaller by about one-fifth - that is actually
reported. About $290 billion in income is annually escaping
US tax, by latest estimate, or roughly $90 billion in income
tax revenue.' Whose money is it? The Treasury Department
3 "In 2005, the IRS estimated this gross tax gap to be approximately $345
billion. After subtracting revenue obtained through enforcement actions
and other late payments, the IRS estimated the net tax gap to be approxi-
mately $290 billion. These estimates, which remain the most recent esti-
mates available, were conducted using data collected in tax year 2001 and
before." U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Update on Reducing the Federal Tax Gap
and Improving Voluntary Compliance (July 8, 2009), page 2. According to
a Cato Institute Report, the US tax gap is actually small in comparison to
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guesses that about half of this untaxed money is earned by
small businesses that are simply committing fraud by not re-
porting it or by claiming undeserved deductions. The other
half is individual and corporate income that is hidden illegi-
timately offshore. If all this income had been properly taxed,
most of the deficits the government was running before 2008,
apart from the Iraq War, would have disappeared. (They had in
fact disappeared at the end of the Clinton administration, even
with the tax gap.) No one really believes that all the fraud and
noncompliance with tax laws could be eliminated, but perhaps
a significant part, perhaps half, might be.4
Until recently, the extent to which US citizens were concealing
their wealth and its income offshore was known neither to the
public nor to most tax professionals in the US. The IRS certain-
ly suspected that the amount was large, because it organized a
special team of investigators to track down the money. After
my talk to the DAJV in summer 2009, the story was released
to the press generally that the US government had reached an
agreement with the Swiss bank UBS, in accordance with which
the bank would release information about 4,450 accounts be-
longing to US citizens, plead guilty to criminal wrongdoing
under US laws, and pay an $870 million fine. Along with the
news, the government announced a limited amnesty program,
inviting US citizens to disclose previously secret offshore ac-
counts in exchange for limited tax and penalties. The response
has been so overwhelming that the IRS has scarcely been able
to deal with the rush of supplicants.5 Congress is now contem-
plating a new law that would give banks outside US jurisdic-
tion certain advantages in exchange for entering into reporting
agreements that would reveal certain information about US
citizens' accounts in these banks.'
What about corporate wealth and income concealed offshore?
The offshore corporate part of the tax gap is money sheltered
illegally, not by taking advantage of the generous policy of de-
ferral but by secretive strategies that are not among those con-
templated by the legislature. The US has a funny rule concern-
ing the income of controlled foreign corporations or CFCs, the
more-than-80%-controlled foreign subsidiaries of US corpo-
rations. By long established common-law tradition, US tax
law treats foreign subs as separate from their parents, so that
their offshore income is not US income until it is "repatriated"
or returned to the parent corporations by voluntary dividends
or liquidation of these foreign subs. The resultant "deferral" of
tax on income the US could, like many other countries, legally
and providently tax, costs the US a lot in lost revenue. But that
is not the money I am referring to as the offshore corporate
part of the tax gap.
The US has over the last 20 years been slowly winning a war
against these tax shelters. In fact, one of the only reasons the
that of other advanced industrial countries. Daniel Mitchell, The Tax Gap
Mirage, 44 Cato Institute Tax & Budget Bulletin, March 2007, page 1. In-
ternational comparisons, however, are unreliable in some respects, because
different countries maintain tax statistics. OECD efforts to compile com-
parative statistics are not yet fully developed. See A Progress Report on the
Jurisdictions Surveyed by The OECD Global Forum in Implementing the
Internationally Agreed Tax Standard (September 9, 2009), at http://www.
oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_33745_423448531 
_II_37427,0
0.html.
4 Joel S. Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves (2d ed. 2009).
5 Department of Justice, News Release: Justice Department & IRS Announce
Results of UBS Settlement & Unprecedented Response in Voluntary Tax
Disclosure Program, November 17, 2009: Lynnley Browning, 14,700 Dis-
closed Offshore Accounts, N.Y. Times, November 17, 2009, p CI.
6 This legislative scheme would extend an existing administrative one that
has similar features but requires less of foreign banks and puts less pressure
on foreign banks to participate. Rev. Proc. 2003-64, Appendix 3, I.R.B.
2003-32.
budget deficits aren't so bad at the moment is that recent tax
collections from the shutdown of bad shelters has been roll-
ing in rather nicely. But the shelters are still big business, and
again based on estimate from the government, it looks as if
there is a lot more tax to be collected from this source.
Thus, fraud accounts for much of the tax gap. Some of that
fraud is politically vulnerable - the offshore corporate part.
One part used to be politically off limits - the onshore small
business part. Things may have changed. The attitude of the
US public at large has especially changed. In the last month of
the presidential campaign, a plumber had an apparently sponta-
neous chat with Barack Obama after one of his public appear-
ances. This man - afterwards known as Joe the Plumber - pro-
tested that Obama's plan to repeal the upper level of the Bush
tax breaks would especially hurt him, and he claimed he was
an ordinary and typical small businessman. This looked as if it
might be very bad publicity for Obama, and McCain promptly
invited Joe the Plumber to appear on the same platform with
him in a number of places. But Joe the Plumber didn't attract
much favorable attention. Already the public had begun to be
skeptical, it seems, of the traditional view that we are all about
to get rich quick. The recession was already beginning to be
felt, and the financial crisis had definitely begun.
In May 2008 the three presidential candidates all proposed tax
relief for the "middle class". I Clinton and Obama proposed
no new business tax breaks, but Obama did promise that, at
least for individual taxpayers with annual net taxable income
of more than $250,000, that is roughly the top 2% of US tax-
payers.
It seemed a year ago that if Obama won, he could not easily
deliver on this promise. It did not seem at all likely that the
election would give the Democrats a strong enough majority
to do this - assuming that the Democrats would back Obama's
proposal. Now the majority is almost strong enough and it
does seem possible that they will fulfill this campaign promise
of the new president. But so much else has changed.
The US government, under calmer and more competent
management, said nothing about tax law refurbishment until
April 2009. Then it suddenly launched a campaign to change
public opinion. On May 5, the New York Times carried a
front-page story based on government releases in which the
falling effective tax rate on overseas income of US corporati-
ons was dramatically illustrated by charts for specific corpor-
ate giants - GE, Pfizer, Exxon Mobil, Citigroup, Chevron and
Merck.' Now the most striking aspect of this government an-
nouncement is the "spin" that blames the use of tax havens for
the falling effective tax rate on US MNCs. Elsewhere in the
government's announcement - and President Obama has used
this factoid himself in several speeches - it is stated that US
MNCs paid an effective rate of tax of only 2.3% on offshore
7 McCain's also included a substantial additional tax break for business: he
would have indefinitely extended the "expensing" (that is, immediate de-
duction instead of gradual write-off) of new purchases of tangible personal
property (Mobilien) to be used in business operations. The estimated cost
of this extension would have been about $60 billion a year. He would also
have reduced middle and upper-middle class income taxes by repealing the
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), which is really a disguised reduction
of the personal deductions available to these taxpayers. This would have
cost an estimated $60 billion a year as well. The total of his proposals
would have increased the then anticipated annual budget deficit by about
1/3, although the stimulative effect of these proposals might have reduced
the deficit. The net effect was impossible to predict, especially with the real
estate bubble and rising fuel prices that were signs of economic instability
ahead.
8 Obama Asks Curb on Havens' Use to Limit Taxes, NY Times, May 5, 2009,
at page IA, col. 6.
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income for 2004, the most recent year for which data are avail-
able - that is, they paid about $16 billion in US income taxes
on offshore economic income estimated to be $700 billion. As
I explained in my talk here a year ago, effective tax rates on
MNC income are falling everywhere in the world,' and the
explanation is at least in part that much of the money is being
earned by operations in low-tax countries - some developing
countries, certainly, but also wealthy developing countries,
and countries like Ireland that have deliberately low rates of
taxation on inbound investment.
Corporate Tax Preferences and Projected Revenue
Costs, FY2008-2017
Preference Revenue Cost
($ Billions)
Expensing and accelerated depreciation
Deduction for U.S. production activities
Exclusion of interest on state and local debt
Research and experimentation (R&E) credit
Deferral of income of controlled foreign corporations
Low income housing credit
Exclusion of interest on life insurance savings
Inventory property sales source rule
Deductibility of charitable contributions
Special Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) rules
Exemption of credit union income
New technology credit
Special Blue Cross/Blue Shield Deduction
Excess of percentage over cost depletion
Other corporate preferences
410
210
135
132
120
55
30
29
28
23
19
8
8
7
Source: Treasury Report, reprinted in CRS, Corporate Tax Reform:
Issues for Congress, Oct. 31. 2007.
The Obama administration has now associated itself with
taxing offshore corporate income, and the chair of the House
Ways and Means Committee Charles Rangel is a strong
advocate of broadening the corporate tax base. One of my pre-
dictions was that the government would try to tax this MNC
income more heavily, probably by weakening the traditional
US tax rule that treats a corporation's distinctness from an-
other corporation as absolute, a rule that makes it possible for
a single group of corporations to be taxed on only part of its
worldwide income. The income of foreign subsidiaries of US
parent corporations is not attributed to the parents, whether
the foreign subsidiaries have permanent establishments
abroad or not.'o
Discussions of international tax design usually refer to several
broad goals - capital import and export neutrality, national
neutrality, and sometimes capital owner equity - and experts
have already begun to debate how the US tax laws should be
9 Martin A. Sullivan, Reported Corporate Effective Tax Rates Down Since
Late 1990s, Tax Notes, 118 Tax Notes 882 (Feb. 25, 2008); Why Reported
Effective Corporate Tax Rates Are Falling, 118 Tax Notes 977 (Mar. 3,
2008).
10 German tax law, I believe, does not tax any income from a foreign Betriebs-
stitte. By contrast, a corporate group that has its central management in
the US is treated as having a non-US parent, if the parent was not formed
and is not now recognized under the law of the US or one of its member
states. Corporate residence has always been analyzed in a purely formal
way for US income tax purposes. Under German law, if Germany is the
situs, in this sense, of a corporation or the place where its Geschsftsleitung
is located, the corporation is liable for German income tax on its world-
wide income, with a credit for taxes paid abroad, and with certain ex-
ceptions, such as that for income from permanent establishments abroad.
Most countries approach the corporate income measurement in this or a
similar way; the US is alone, as far as I can tell, in adherence to the formal
understanding of corporate residence.
modified to meet these goals better. Briefly, it can be argued
plausibly that a change in the definition of corporate residence
and perhaps the repeal of "deferral" altogether would improve
the capital export neutrality of US tax law. But it would also
modestly raise the effective rate of the corporate tax overall.
The argument would of course be made that this is a terrible
thing to do at any time, but especially so in a financial cri-
sis. The effective rate might be kept the same or even lowered
if corporate tax preferences - deductions, credits and sheer
exemptions - were curtailed, and this would in theory make
the corporate tax fairer without driving away investors.
This possible change in the residence rules for corporations
is best understood in a broader context. Three goals of inter-
national tax policy are often singled out: capital export neu-
trality (tax-neutral treatment of invested capital of a country's
own residents, no matter where it is invested), capital import
neutrality (tax-neutral treatment of investment in the taxing
country, no matter whether the investors are resident or non-
resident), and national neutrality (equal return on investment,
requiring foreign-source income to be taxed with a credit for
foreign taxes paid). To achieve these goals, two broad types
of taxing strategy that may be used, more or less faithfully
in practice, are residence-based taxation (tax only your own
residents without regard to where they earn their income) and
source-based taxation (tax only the income arising within your
borders, regardless of whether those whose income it is are
resident or not).
Capital export neutrality requires a country to apply the same
tax rate to firms' investments in or out of the country and
would be a straightforward consequence of a residence-based
tax system. Capital import neutrality requires that tax burdens
on firms of different national residence that invest in the same
country should be the same, and a territorial or source-based
tax would straightforwardly accomplish neutrality in this re-
spect. National neutrality requires that the nation's total return
on investment, the sum of national tax revenue and domes-
tic firms' profits, should be the same wherever it is earned,
in the country or abroad. This form of neutrality is obtained
by taxing foreign-source income and allowing a deduction for
foreign taxes."
In terms of these theoretical goals, it seems that changing the
US residence rules may improve the capital export neutrality
of the US tax system, by causing more investment abroad to
face the same rate of tax investment at home faces. It should
have no effect on capital import neutrality. And it may in-
crease the national neutrality of the current system. So two out
of three goals would be better served.
The US now uses a hybrid residence and source-based ap-
proach. It does not tax nonresident corporate income, even if
the nonresident corporation is controlled by a US parent. This
seems faithful to the goal of capital export neutrality. But it
also credits foreign taxes paid, if foreign subsidiaries send their
earnings back to their US parents. This seems to accord with
national neutrality. And it taxes US-source income of nonresi-
II Other concerns may be peculiar to the economic predicament of advanced
industrial nations. When capital is plentiful within a national economy,
to discourage in-bound investment may promote national welfare, by en-
couraging the use of domestic labor instead of foreign capital (all this
assumes that capital and labor are in relevant measure interchangeable
within the economy as a whole). Fending off foreign capital, if this reason-
ing is sound, hurts foreign labor, by leaving more capital to be invested in
the foreign country itself. A policy that serves to balance the use of capital
and labor within a country, sometimes called national neutrality, is at odds
with capital import neutrality. See David L. Brumbaugh, international
Taxation and Competitiveness, Congressional Research Service Report,
May 19, 2006, page 5.
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dents in a selective way (selective because the US source rules
could be very different than they are, especially, the portfolio
interest exemption and the exemption of capital gains of non-
residents), which partly accords with capital import neutrality.
Actually, the US is extremely non-neutral vis-A-vis inbound
passive investment.
When you look at it at this general level, relaxing the distinc-
tion between US parent corporations and their non-US subsi-
diaries - which is what the Obama administration may now
want to do, and which is what I predicted any new president
might have to do - might make the US less neutral on capital
export. Capital export non-neutrality can lead to capital export
retaliation. It would also, in the case of the US, lead to a very
different treatment of developed and developing countries, be-
cause our treaties would still prevent the US from taking per-
manent establishments in treaty-partner countries. This would
be a dangerous strategy at a time when the lists of developed
and developing countries may be changing rapidly.
There are, however, other tax goals that are not particularly
concerned with international tax neutrality. Taxing CFCs more
heavily raises the effective rate of the corporate tax, if we
regard all the relevant corporations as properly comparable
to corporations that are exclusively active in the US. Inter-
national corporate tax is after all a small part of the corporate
tax as a whole, in terms of the amount of US foreign outbound
investment as a share of overall corporate investment.12 Critics
of the corporate income tax have long argued that it burdens
domestic investment, by lowering the effective rate of return
on invested capital. Increasing the effective rate of tax on mul-
tinational corporations is, from that perspective, a bad thing,
because it will increase the effective rate of tax on US corpo-
rations generally. Several economists have therefore argued
that instead of increasing the tax at the corporate level, the tax
system should be adjusted to tax distributions to shareholders
more heavily. By increasing the rate of tax on dividends, the
overall design might buy a lower rate of tax on corporate in-
come as such.'3
Economists' view that corporate tax must distort investment
incentives is all about the return on investment in the corpo-
rate sector as a whole. Corporations in the US have conspicu-
ously expressed almost no interest in efforts to eliminate the
distortion resulting from the double corporate tax. Instead,
they have been happy to "game the system" by striving for the
competitive advantage of a lower rate of tax than the rate faced
by rival US corporations. (In 1991, on leaving office, George
Bush Sr. had his Treasury Department publish a report calling
for elimination of the double corporate tax, and the National
Association of Manufacturers, the biggest corporate trade as-
sociation, openly said it had little interest in that goal.)
It therefore seems that the double corporate tax, beloved of
corporations, is a doubly bad thing. Not only does it distort
investment incentives for investors in the corporate sector as
a whole, it also distorts business practices of US corporations,
inspiring them to shape their business decisions to achieve tax
advantages over their rivals.
If this is a correct diagnosis of the problem as a whole, the
Obama administration should both eliminate tax deferral and
broaden the corporate tax base. Unfortunately, the principal
corporate tax preferences seem to be the very ones, apart from
12 "Despite increasing globalization of the U.S. economy, foreign direct in-
vestment remains a small share of the U.S.-owned capital stock." David L.
Brumbaugh & Jane Gravelle, Reform of International Taxation: Alterna-
tives, Congressional Research Service Report, July 31, 2007, at page 21.
13 Id. at pages 21-23.
the tax benefit of deferral, that are always boosted in an eco-
nomic downturn: enhanced write-offs for depreciable proper-
ty and R&D. Some of the others have been mentioned by
Treasury Secretary Geithner as among the administration's tax
reform measures: elimination of LIFO inventory accounting
(an easy thing to do in deflationary times) and the exclusion of
corporate owned life insurance (COLI) benefits.
The correspondence between the tax reform measures theo-
rists have identified and those for which the Obama adminis-
tration has released trial balloons is impressive. This suggests
that the current government is at least looking for objectively
reasonable reform strategies, not just serving as a mouthpiece
for lobbyists. But is theory right?
Perhaps the most important proposal so far is the Obama ad-
ministration's demand for better tax enforcement. This means
requiring that a wider range of intermediaries disclose the
income of US taxpayers and related information, as well as
giving the IRS more money for enforcing the tax law. At
present the percentage of US tax returns that are audited is less
than 2%. It would be easy to audit more if intermediaries gave
the IRS more information - computers could then match the
disclosed information with tax returns, as they already do for
most taxpayers who are employees.
Better tax enforcement is not a new theme for presidents, but
it is possible that the less friendly attitude of the public to-
wards financial institutions and big corporations may result in
a major increase in tax revenue. Some types of enforcement
do not require congressional approval. For example: In April
2009 the IRS offered "qualified intermediaries" - primarily
foreign banks and other financial institutions - a choice of
voluntarily disclosing more information or facing closer scru-
tiny from the IRS. This choice takes the form of "allowing"
foreign institutions to apply for the benefits - less stringent
reporting of their own proprietary information - in exchange
for greater disclosure of their US clients' tax-sensitive infor-
mation to the IRS.
Conspicuously absent from the White House Green Book on
Revenue Raising Tax Proposals, May 11, 2009, is any hint at
reducing corporate tax "expensing" or raising tax rates on in-
dividuals with taxable incomes of less than $250,000. Both
would be enormous revenue raisers, but both would be (or be
perceived as) restraining rather than stimulating the economy.
What specific changes in the tax rules has the Obama adminis-
tration proposed? The idea of taxing offshore corporate earn-
ings has not yet been explained in detail. On the following list,
some have been explained and others have not:
(1) Limit the benefit of personal deductions for high-income
taxpayers by limiting them to the 28% rate. A taxpayer
in the 35% tax bracket can save $35,000 by deducting
mortgage interest of $100,000, but under this proposal,
he/she would save only $28,000. The estimated 10-year
tax revenue is $267 billion.
(2) Change the "check-the-box" rules for entity recognition
as they apply to entities involved in cross-border transac-
tions. Many tax shelters use the formal recognition for
US tax purposes of entities specially formed to absorb in-
come or generate losses for US corporate and sometimes
individual taxpayers. The purpose would be to curtail
this. Details are not known. Could require deep changes
in the partnership tax rules.
(3) Re-characterize "carried interest" income as ordinary
income instead of capital gain -- $24 billion. Just how
this would work has not been explained, but we know
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it would not be easy as a technical matter. Also change
partnership tax rules.
(4) Repeal the exclusion of employer-provided health insur-
ance above a certain value -- $120 billion (1-year).
(5) Repeal the exclusion of life insurance benefits that flow to
corporations (COLI benefits) -- $12 billion (10-year).
(6) Repeal LIFO accounting -- $61 billion (10-year).
(7) Keep the federal estate tax with a $1.2 million estate
exemption -- $24.5 billion (10-year).
(8) Reduce real estate tax preferences, including the exclu-
sion for gain on principal residence and passive loss rule
exemption for real estate developers.
(9) Reduce oil and gas tax preferences -- $31.5 billion (10-
year).
(10) Codify the "economic substance" doctrine, a standard for
disallowing claimed tax advantages on the grounds that
the underlying nature of the transactions involved does
not qualify for those advantages -- $4.7 billion (10-year).
The total is only about $700 billion, or $70 billion a year.
One further item, not covered in the Green Book: The Obama
administration has of course also strongly advocated universal
health coverage, with a permanent research and development
expense deduction that will benefit big pharmaceutical com-
panies, but the insurance companies have just as strenuously
resisted the idea that government-sponsored insurance should
be offered to everyone.14 White House and Congress are now
considering taxing employer-provided health care benefits, to
fund health care for all." The amount of tax forgone is roughly
$130 billion for 2008, and will rise to about $200 billion by
2014, if the current exclusion from employees' income con-
tinues. 6 Current proposals that form part of congressional
bills for health care reform would tax only part of the value of
employer-provided health insurance above certain dollar value
thresholds.
Is the Obama administration only re-arranging the deck chairs
on the Titanic? The revenue raised by these proposals isn't
enough to deal with the long-term problem deficits caused by
the current financial crisis and bailout efforts. A modest tax
increase across the board might finance the debt service on
the increased national debt, but increased debt may pose other
problems." The future could be more difficult to predict, but I
think tax increases for the Middle Class are coming. Probably
only after the economic downturn - if we can wait that long.
14 Robert Pear, Health Care Leaders Say Obama Overstated Their Promise
to Control Costs, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2009; Paul Krugman, Blue Double
Cross, May 21, 2009.
15 Janet Adamy, New Taxes Loom to Fund Health Care, W. St. J. 5/18/09
(discussing an interview with the Office of Management and Budget Di-
rector Peter Orszag).
16 The Brookings Institution estimates, which are likely to be even-hand-
ed, are given at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.
cfm?Docid=375 (Stand: ...).
17 Paul Krugman, State of Paralysis, N.Y. Times, May 25, 2009.
Harry R. Dammer*
The Crime of Human Trafficking
This is a summary of the presentation given by Harry Dam-
mer* to the DAJV and graduate students at Bonn University
on June 4t, 2009.
I am grateful for the invitation to speak to the DAJV and visit
this prestigious University. And, special thanks to Prof Bose
and his staff for organizing my trip to Bonn. Today I speak to
you about a crime problem that has been a major concern of
law enforcement personal across the globe for the past decade
or so....the problem of human trafficking (HT). More speci-
fically, I will try to answer four questions about HT. The first
is, what is HT or how is it defined in the international commu-
nity? Second, what is the extent of the global problem of HT?
Third, how does HT happen? Fourth and finally, what can we
do about this serious crime problem?
What is human trafficking?
Although there are different definitions of HT in different
countries and within various international documents a good
starting point for a formal definition of HT is as follows: Hu-
man trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring or receipt of persons by use of force, threat, fraud,
* From March 2009 through July 2009 Harry R. Dammer, Ph.D. was a visit-
ing Fulbright Scholar at the Ruhr University-Bochum. In the United States,
Dr. Dammer is Chair and Professor of Criminal Justice and Sociology at the
University of Scranton (PA) in USA. Any comments can be directed to him
at dammerh2@scranton.edu.
or coercion for the purpose of exploitation (most often sexual
exploitation or forced labor).
Before proceeding about the extent of the problem let us talk
a little about why the HT is something that we should be con-
cerned with at this point in history. Most obvious, HT is a trans-
national crime. Less obvious may be that HT problematic be-
cause it is a modern form of slavery-moving vulnerable po-
pulations (from poor areas) to serve the labor needs of others.
And HT can also lead to other forms of social problems/crimes.
Each of these are self explanatory so I will not linger on each
but this gives someone who was previously unaware of the
reach of HT some idea how extensive the problem can be.
* Illegal adoptions/sale of babies
* Child pornography
* Trading in body parts
* Murder of prostitutes
* Domestic abuse of mail order brides
* Street prostitution
What is the extent of human trafficking
in the world today?
It is difficult to measure the extent of this international crime
scourge but some indicators are the following data. In 2006
the U.S. Government reported 800,000 were trafficked across
borders with over 80% being females. Recent UN reports es-
timate that the problem to be far greater with reports of 12.3
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